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Cases and Materials on Soviet Law. By John N. Hazard and Morris L. Weisberg. New York: Mimeograph, 1950. Pp. iv, 431. $5.00.

In another issue of this Law Review, Professor Hazard has reported on the
recent growth of interest in this country in foreign and comparative law., Under this trend and in connection with the general interest in the Soviet Union,
Soviet law has met with attention. To the books by Schlesinger,2 GsovskiP and
Berman, 4 the English translation of the treatise by Vyshinskis and a large number of articles in periodicals, 6 there has now been added this collection of source
materials by two one-time students of comparative law at the University of
Chicago Law School, John N. Hazard, Professor of Public Law at Columbia
University, and Morris L. Weisberg, Gowen Teaching Fellow at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School. The book has been designed for class room purposes and has been used in actual teaching by its authors. As a well designed and
rich presentation of decisions of Soviet courts and other documents of actual
legal life, the book should be made more easily accessible to the general reader,
for whom it is certain to be instructive.
The book illustrates how effectively legal materials may be used to provide
an access not only to a foreign country's legal system but to its general culture
and patterns of life. Toward a visualization of "Inside Russia," our book may
be a better guide than many a travelogue. The cases represent the daily lives
of the Soviet people and the daily activities of the Soviet administration. They
are taken from all parts of the U.S.S.R., from the Pukhovicheskii District,
Byelorussian S.S.R., to Sakhalin, and from Arkhangelsk in the North to
Ashkabad or Tbilisi in the South. Cases of Gosarbitrazh illustrate dealings between the production, transportation and distribution units of the economy;
there are disputes between management and worker, the quarrels between
tenants of a crowded building, the universal problems of marriage, divorce and
non-support. There are human interest stories, like that of the tragic love between the daughter of the aristocrat, here the poor peasant, and the son of the
outcast, the kulak; of the troubles of a state sheep farm in Kazolkistan, where
bookkeeping is sloppy, the management in the hands of prisoners, and sheep
are killed by the wolves of the steppe; of the tribulations of the faithful bookkeeper at the Moscow food store, who informs the authorities of his fellow
workers' peculations, only to find himself accused along with them, but emerging
triumphant in the end; of the manager of the lonely trading post in Sakhalin
who cannot resist the temptation to use for himself the one piano that has
reached his store and to sell for his own benefit the gramophone records.
I Comparative Law in Legal Education, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 264 (1951).
2Soviet Legal Theory: Its Social Background and Development (1945).
3Soviet CivilLaw (1948).
4Justice in Russia: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (i5o).
5 The Law of the Soviet State (Babb trans., 1948).
6The list in Hazard and Weisberg's book is seven pages long.
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What emerges from the book is a colorful picture of human life both in its
universal aspects and its peculiar setting. What also emerges is an impressive
picture of a sustained and consistent effort on the part of the higher courts to
protect the individual citizen against the arbitrariness or ineptitude of plant
managers, local authorities and lower courts.
Of particular interest in this respect is the role of the public prosecutor as
the protector of the law, not only against, but also for, the individual. How
seriously this task is taken is shown by the large number of cases, criminal, civil
and administrative, in which an oppressive act, an unjust conviction or a wrong
decision is remedied upon the initiative of the prosecutor. There also emerges
a picture of the Supreme Court, waging a consistent and apparently successful
struggle to aid the government in its effort to re-establish a stable system of
law after the chaotic days of early revolutionary justice. In case after case we
can watch the Court insist on observance of procedural forms and strict compliance with their rules of evidence. Convictions or civil judgments based upon
insufficient evidence seem to have little chance to survive the scrutiny of the
higher echelons in the prosecutor's office or in the higher courts.
But, do these cases present the total picture?
In his description of the legal system of National-Socialist Germany, Ernst
Fraenkel coined the term "dual state."7 This term would seem to be helpful in
the analysis of a type of state which has appeared repeatedly in history, and
of which both National-Socialist Germany and the U.S.S.R. have presented contemporary illustrations. Characteristically, the absolute monarchies of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established a smoothly-functioning system of courts which faithfully applied an elaborate system of legal rules. These
rules provided stability and predictability in the private relations of the citizens, and especially in the fields of criminal law and taxation, in the relations
between the citizen and the state. To this extent, the rule of law provided effective guarantees of the individual's life, liberty and property. But they could
at any time be swept away by the royal prerogative, which not only existed
alongside the sphere of the rule of law but was superior to it in the sense that
it could generally determine how far the rule of law should reach and could also
intervene in that sphere whenever it was required by raison d'etat. But it was
that very raison d' att which required a firm, reliable and predictable administration of justice lest the basic ends of governmental policy be jeopardized.
Thus, we had in Tudor England, in France of Louis XIV, in Prussia of Frederick
II, or in Austria of Joseph II, side by side the rule of law and the prerogative
state. The former found expression in the activities of the courts and the various
controls over the field staff of the administration, the latter in those activities
of the ruler and his staff in which he did not recognize any rules superior to his
will.
This system of the dual state has been resurrected in modern totalitarianism.
7 The Dual State (194i).
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It would have been wrong to visualize National-Socialist Germany as a country
with a completely arbitrary government or lawless courts. As far as the courts
had jurisdiction they not only made an impressive attempt to maintain the
rule of law but they also put up an often courageous struggle for their independence. But their jurisdiction was increasingly restricted and subjected to
arbitrary intervention by the Gestapo and other representatives of the prerogative state, which finally had devised means not only to withhold from the
courts jurisdiction in the most important classes of cases but also to remove
from them any individual case.
This phenomenon of the dual state seems to be presented again by the
Soviet Union. If the central government wishes to enforce its policy of building
the new communist society, it must insist on both the faithful execution of its
directives through all of its functionaries in the administrative and the economic sphere, and on safeguarding the rights of the individual citizen, without
whose basic consent the government would be powerless. In these necessities,
we find the gist of that insistence upon law and state power as against earlier
Marxist doctrine of the state's withering away, and the real issue of that
otherwise unintelligible dispute about the nature of Marxist law, which is illustrated by the materials of the first chapter of our book. Simultaneously,
however, the central government must preserve its untrammeled freedom of
action outside of the law or, at least seemingly, against the law. But here we
encounter the very characteristic of the dual state. The governmental prerogative and the government's power at any time to determine, contract, or
expand its scope, is a part, indeed the most essential part, of the law of the
dual state. Hence, within that system, no act of the prerogative can be against
the law.
Obviously, a book which primarily consists of a collection of judicial decisions, can well illustrate the sphere of the rule of law, but it is less apt to present the activities of the prerogative. One of the most far-reaching bases of
these activities is presented by the text of the Decrees on the establishment of
a "special board" in the then People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with
power to exile, banish, or intern "persons who are recognized as being socially
dangerous." Here we have the basis, or at least one of the bases of the -present
MVD. The decree itself limits the maximum period of these prerogative measures to five years. How is this limit observed? How are the measures carried
out? Are there other decrees permitting or regulating similar measures in a different context? Here the book is silent. Possibly, no answer can be given to
these questions. By a careful scrutiny of German newspapers and other reports, Dr. Fraenkel was able to give a fairly accurate picture of the activities
of the prerogative state of the National-Socialists. Soviet secrecy has cut us off
from first hand observation. Yet, there might be revealing passages in the
daily press and even occasional judicial decisions or published administrative
rulings which might allow us at least an occasional glance. Some material of

.T95.r]

BOOK REVIEWS

this kind is in the book, but it would be more conspicuous to both the authors
and their readers if the contents were re-arranged.
The book starts with an introductory chapter on Soviet legal theory. All
following chapters are centered on "protection," first, one chapter on state and
society (47 pages), then five chapters on protection of the individual (i6o
pages), four chapters on protection of property (120 pages), and finally, two
chapters on protection of the family (5o pages). This arrangement does not appear to bring out the characteristic features of Soviet law. It appears particularly questionable to bring together in one chapter, entitled "Protection of
the Individual-The Commercial Relationship," the rules of contract obtaining both for the small dealings of individual citizens and the gigantic transactions between socialist economic enterprises. These dealings are carried on,
indeed, by means of contracts which not only resemble those between capitalistic enterprises in the nonsocialist world, but actually present the same problems, as, for instance, those of offer and acceptance, mistake, fraud, supervening impossibility, defect of title or quality, damages, etc. However, these contracts are made between the socialist enterprises within the framework of and
in accordance with the overall economic plan by which production and distribution are determined. This interplay of central plan and implementing
particular contracts presents one of the most important and interesting problems of the Soviet system. How does it work? The book contains many cases
throwing light upon this central problem, but they are scattered over too many
different parts of the book, as are also the cases which illustrate the problem
of the means by which the automatic control of the market operates in the
socialist economy of the U.S.S.R. There are a considerable number of cases illustrating the use of the criminal law sanction as a weapon in the fight against
economic inefficiency; but there is little to present the incentives of promotion,
honor, increased income, or the general enthusiasm of building a new society.
The decrees instituting the title of Hero of Labor, or a proclamation of an
award of individual honors, might well have found a place in a collection of materials on Soviet law.
If, as it is to be hoped, the book will be published in a printed edition, the authors might consider re-arranging their fascinating materials along some such
lines as the following. After introductory chapters on Soviet legal theory, the
organization of the administration of justice, and a presently not existing but
desirable chapter on the constitutional organization of the U.S.S.R. and its
constituent parts, there should be three principal parts: (i) the position of the
individual within the sphere of law; (2) the position of the individual within
the sphere of prerogative; and (3) the legal regulation of the socialist sector of
the economy. In this third part, a systematic effort should be made to present
the overall organization of the economy, especially the planning and steering
agencies; then the organization of the units of production and distribution,
their relations to the planning and steering agencies and among each other;
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and, finally, the devices of control and guarantee of economic efficiency of those
engaged in the managerial and productive activities. It would seem that some
such scheme of arrangement would increase the usefulness of the rich materials
of the book.
In connection with the strictly legal institutions, an American reader may
often wonder at what he may regard as Soviet peculiarities. However, Soviet
law qua law does not present many features which might not also be found in
other countries, ardent Soviet claims to originality notwithstanding. After all,
where law is to reign the problems are by and large the same all the modern
world over, and the stock of available solutions is limited. Private, procedural
and criminal law of the U.S.S.R. have grown upon the soil of the long tradition
of Western civilization and, in view of the close contacts with Western and
Central Europe of both Marxism and Russia, it was inevitable for Soviet law
to build upon the foundations of the civil law traditions of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Obviously, these institutions had to be adapted to the new
setting; but even the most conspicuous contribution of Soviet law, the farreaching role of the prosecutor as the guardian of the law, has its roots in the
legal systems of FranCe, Germany and Czarist Russia. These connections of
Soviet law with the general stream of Western legal development are hardly,
if ever, indicated in our book. However, if the reader is not made aware of these
antecedents and parallels, his view may easily be distorted.
As a final wish, one would like to see an index, a translation of the titles of
the Soviet publications listed in the Table of Abbreviations and, perhaps, some
guide to the pronunciation of all the Russian words and names. There should
also be explanations of those numerous abbreviated names of administrative
and economic agencies which appear in the text.
MAX RiEEINSTEIN*

Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. By Harold D. Lasswell
and Abraham Kaplan. New Haven: Yale University Press, i95o. Pp. xxiv,
295. 84.oo.

Of all political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell has turned most vigorously
from the shadows of the cave. Working now alone, then again with extraordinary associates, he has produced a series of remarkable studies over twenty
years. The terms "challenging," "exaggerated," and "unusual,"--with a grudging, querulous air about them-have often been applied to his books by illustrious men who ought to know better. When one thinks of that strange compote which has been political science-demi-law, quasi-history, semi-morality,
and metaphysics, with many seeds of empirical generalization-and then examines Lasswell's works, he must perceive that they deserve the highest
admiration and respect. It may be that the science of human relations will be
* Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law School.

